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In April 2004, the Japanese government incorporated the national universities as 
“independent administrative entities”. This important change in Japan’s research culture has 
allowed its universities to gain higher control and oversight over their strategic development 
trajectories. In this paper, we will present an analysis centered on the legislative changes 
concerning intellectual property and their impact on Japanese universities. We will 
particularly focus our attention on a leading Japanese research institution: Tohoku 
University.  We will analyze the different mechanisms that have been put in place to foster 
the use of patents by faculty members. In that respect, we introduce a differentiation between 
university-owned and university-invented patents, and put emphasis on the difference in 
patenting behaviors among scientific disciplines. Finally, we argue that contractual research is 
a major channel for the technology transfer of Japanese universities’ knowledge and findings.  
￿Keywords: science policy, academic research, academic patenting, Japan.  
JEL: O31, 034, O53.   2
 
1 Introduction 
Recent work on universities has led many scholars to investigate the incentives behind 
academic patenting. This stream of literature began with the enactment of the Bayh-Dole 
Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, which allowed American universities to 
receive patents and grant licenses from research funded by the federal government. Patent 
grants to American universities have peaked in 2002 at just under 3,300, compared to 300 in 
the seventies. The biomedical related patent classes dominate these awards (National Science 
Board, 2008). Most observers attribute this tendency to the legislative change, but it is worth 
noting that the trend preceded the Act: Colyvas et al. (2002), based on case studies, argue that 
two other factors could explain the surge. First, the period saw the rise of important new areas 
of university research, namely molecular biology and computer science; both of which are of 
particular interest to the industry. Secondly, over the same time, various Patent Offices 
increased the range of research results that were patentable. In their view, these two elements 
were leading the increase in patenting and licensing, the principal effect of the Act being to 
accelerate these trends. 
The increasing reliance on patenting has raised many questions in the literature. The 
enthusiasts spoke with emphasis of the increasing role of universities in economic 
development. The “Triple Helix” concept (Etzkowitz, 2003) sees patenting by universities as 
an indicator of their involvement in the commercialization activities, beyond the traditional 
role of research and teaching. In the same vein, Jensen and Thursby (2004) show that direct 
involvement of scholars has proven to be determinant in the success of technology transfer. 
Skeptics consider that the increase in patenting and commercialization by universities could 
lead to some caveats. It is possible that industry uses its growing relative importance to shape 
research agendas, inducing a redistribution of resources from basic to applied research. Other 
possibly negative effects of academic patenting include potential conflicts of interest, secrecy 
issues, delays in the publication process and increased costs of research (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998). A growing “anti-commons” perspective highlights the negative role of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) over scientific knowledge. Academic inventors may have 
to use patents to protect and exchange their new knowledge. In that respect, patenting is seen 
as a defensive mechanism to enable the diffusion of knowledge. This new situation may be 
less efficient than the previous reliance on pure “open science” because of the transaction and 
maintenance costs associated with patenting. A large number of studies has examined the 
impact of patenting activity on academic research; while the majority of the research has been 
centered on the US and Europe, very little has been said about Asia. The prime aim of this 
paper is to start filing this gap. We will look closely at the Japanese case and provide an 
analysis of a leading Japanese research university, Tohoku University. To our knowledge 
there is no study available in English on this topic centered on the recent Japanese context. 
We will investigate the mechanisms at stake, and meticulously whittle the salient figures. 
Our analysis is based on data in English and Japanese for the Japanese context and on 
internal documents for Tohoku University. The work presented here has for main objective to 
analyze the implications of four years of drastic changes resulting from the Incorporation of 
national universities in 2004, as this marks the moment when Japanese national universities 
started gaining control of their strategic development. The national universities are not a   3
homogeneous entity anymore; they can develop their own distinctive strategy. The legal 
system where they evolved has changed dramatically, and each single university now has to 
adapt to this new environment. In this context, it is very interesting to study the changes in 
terms of IPR policies for the universities and to determine how these changes have modified 
the behavior of faculty members. For these reasons, we believe scholars would gain from an 
increased scrutiny of the Japanese experience: because of the difficulty of the Japanese 
language, many findings and documents have not yet been publicized to a wider audience. We 
intend to partly fill this gap. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the different channels of 
university technology transfer. Section 3 presents a description of the Japanese case in terms 
of institutional reforms and links them to academic patenting. Section 4 then moves to a 
description of the Tohoku University case. Section 5 discusses the implications of the 
increasing use of IPRs by Japanese universities. 
2 The different types of university-based technology transfers 
It is valuable to note that universities have always been involved in technological transfer. For 
instance, with the role of German academicians in the development of the 19th century 
chemical industry, or as the seminal work of Rosenberg and Nelson (1994) has documented, 
there is a long tradition of universities transferring knowledge and technology to firms, 
though this has mainly occurred through channels like publishing, consulting, conferences, 
etc. In the case of Japan the government launched, in 1886, the first Japanese Department of 
Engineering in the University of Tokyo. It was the first Engineering Department within a 
university (not in a College, Institute, etc.) in the world. This department has a long history of 
transferring knowledge and technology, as well as collaborating with industry (Murakami, 
1994).  These three examples stress the importance and long record of university-based 
technology transfers. Nowadays, the difference is that the political and economical spheres 
have put increasing pressure on universities to encourage a more active transfer of their 
knowledge to society, and particularly to contribute to economic development. As noted by 
Geuna and Muscio  (2008), there is an institutionalization of university-industry linkages 
through the direct involvement of the university bureaucracy. As we will see in the next 
section, this process is prevailing in Japan, too. 
In terms of technology transfer mechanisms, many different channels characterize 
university-industry relationships. First, there are the traditional publication and conference 
mediums. Within this first one are personal contacts; on the one hand among faculty members 
and students, on the other, between academic researchers, industry and government. The 
second way is the professionalization of knowledge transfer activities, the so-called third 
mission of the university. In order to fulfill this mission, Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) 
or Technology Liaison Offices (TLO) have been created within universities. TTOs tend to be 
focused mainly on the exploitation of IPRs via licensing or the creation of spin-offs, but are 
also active in supporting university-industry interactions via contractual research or 
consultancy. 
The majority of studies focused on knowledge transfer use three kinds of data: patents 
and invention disclosures, licenses and spin-offs. Such data is increasingly employed as it   4
becomes widely available; the first two are now standardized information. This information is 
used as a proxy to measure technological transfer by universities. In this paper, we intend to 
focus on the academic patenting of Japanese institutions, as it becomes a widely used 
mechanism by research universities. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that IPR-
related activities are only a small part of the knowledge transfer activity of universities. 
Agrawal and Henderson  (2002) argue that “too great a focus on patenting may seriously 
misrepresent the nature of the impact of the university on the private sector”. 
3 The case of Japan 
In this section, we introduce the legislative changes that occurred in Japan concerning the 
university-industry settings. We particularly focus on their influence on the IPR regime, and 
stress the importance of contractual research as a mean of transferring knowledge and 
technology.  
3.1 University Reform 
In order to understand the development of academic patenting activities in Japan, it is 
necessary to restate some key institutional reforms that have led to a dramatic increase in 
university-owned patent. We will investigate the changes of national universities’ legal status 
where the majority of academic research takes place, as well as the modifications that 
occurred in the university-industry legal framework. 
University-industry collaboration has evolved recently in order to facilitate interaction 
between the two institutions. Until 1980, restrictive government regulations caused levels of 
university-industry collaboration to remain low. In 1983, the Ministry of Education relaxed its 
regulations, and notably allowed national universities to cooperate with industry. However, it 
is only after the introduction of the 1995 Science & Technology Basic Law and the TLO Law 
that the real changes began. 
We can step into the argument by briefly stating the main Laws that are structuring the 
technology transfer activities within universities. Below are the three main ones shaping the 
legal framework: 
1.  The 1998 Law to Promote the Transfer of University Technologies (the TLO Law) 
legitimized and facilitated transparent and contractual transfers of university 
discoveries to industry. 
2.  The 1999 Law of Special Measures to Revive Industry (the Japanese Bayh-Dole Law) 
 
3.  The 2000 Law to Strengthen Industrial Technology established procedures, through 
which university researchers can obtain permission to consult for, establish and even 
manage companies. It also streamlined the procedures for company sponsored 
commissioned and joint research. 
   
All these legislative changes have been listed here to illustrate the increasing 
importance that the Japanese authorities place on university-industry collaborations and one   5
of its corollaries, patenting. 
Another important factor is the change in status of national universities and its 
influence on patenting patterns. The anchoring points of the university reform is the Toyama 
Plan (2001) named after the Minister for Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
Atsuko Toyama. This plan proposed three major reforms: 1) the reorganization and 
incorporation of national universities, 2) the development of universities that conform to the 
highest international standards by using third party evaluation, and 3) increasing the 
proportion of competitive funding. The plan recommended that national universities should be 
transformed into national university corporations (NUC), a legally separate institution from 
the government. Following these lines, in April 2004, the Japanese government incorporated 
the national universities as “independent administrative entities”
1. Since 2004, the universities 
have gained a greater autonomy. They can recruit more easily academic and non-academic 
staff. Moreover, they can maintain the ownership of their invention, which was seldom the 
case before the Incorporation. Consequently, there has been a surge in cooperative contracts, 
in number and amount, as well as in patents. 
[Fig. 1: Invention Disclosures and Patent Applications by National Universities] 
Since 2004, national universities have been solely managing their intellectual 
property. Figure 1 shows the influence of these changes of status on invention disclosures and 
patent applications; the invention disclosures have started to rise before the Incorporation, 
with a strong hike from 2002 and 2003, it preceded the increase of patenting, thereafter the 
number only slightly increased indicating a kind of plateau around 7,500. As for patent 
applications, the number skyrocketed in 2004, and increased steadily thereafter. In 2007, the 
number of national patent applications decreased for the first time, while the number of 
foreign applications intensified. These figures indicate two tendencies: first the Incorporation 
entailed a huge increase in IPR activities; second, in 2007-8, it seems to have reached a peak. 
Furthermore, universities seem to have gained expertise and quality as the number of national 
applications decreased and foreign ones increased in 2007. Foreign applications are often 
judged of more value to the applicant as they cost more to start and maintain
2. 
Universities all over the world are increasingly patenting the outcome of their research 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Mowery et al., 2001). Our data shows that Japan is also following 
this upward trend.  Together with research and teaching, universities are being asked to be the 
generators of future economic growth. Nowadays, Japanese universities are directly managing 
their IPRs, and are thus more prone to maximize the number of patents they can produce. 
New rules have been enacted about the invention disclosure process in order to facilitate 
patenting. Secondly, with time passing, the administrative staff has complied with the new 
regulations, and has accepted the notion of patentability of university inventions, and market 
orientation of some research. At the same time, they have increased their expertise, which had 
the consequence to entail a slight drop in the number of applications: the inventions are now 
scrutinized more thoroughly. 
                                                          
1 
 Generally, in case of an international application, Japanese universities used the unified procedure provided by the Patent 
ooperation Treaty. They employ the same documents as for the national application, with a delay of one year. 




On a more sociological note, we can introduce the notion developed by Sine 
et  al.  (2003) on institutional prestige: in our case we could argue that the prestige of the 
university is linked to the level of the patenting activity together with the publication output. 
Recently, information has started to be compiled to rank universities by technological 
strength, based on the number of patents issued and their relevance (Staedter, 2003) As these 
indicators are often used in rankings, more is necessarily better. Hence, legal changes have 
put more emphasis on patenting in the decision-making processes of universities. Figure 2 
shows the number of patent applications by Japanese universities in terms of patents per year: 
in 2003, 61 universities had applied for 1 to 9 patents, a number that rose to 115 universities 
in 2005. The tendency is the same for the highest bracket: in 2003, only one university 
applied for more than 200 patents, in 2005 there were 7. This illustrates the fact that 
universities quickly embraced the use of patents, at both ends of the spectrum. However, we 
should remain cautious about the total increase of patents applied by Japanese universities; 
universities not previously active in patenting account for a significant part of the growth in 
overall university patenting. This phenomenon has been similar in the US in the 70s, as 
noticed by Mowery et al. (2001). 
[Fig. 2: Patent Applied by Japanese Universities According to Frequency] 
3.2 Organizational structure of IP management institutions 
In 1997, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
3, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), proposed to extend 
the support of university-industry cooperation. An important part of this initiative was the 
creation of TLOs. In 1998, national universities had no independent legal standing, and thus it 
was difficult to apply for patents on inventions by their faculty and to license such inventions. 
The  Technology Transfer Law authorized universities to establish independent or semi-
independent TLOs that could sell or license inventions and distribute royalties to inventors 
and universities. However, academic inventors were not obliged to assign their inventions to 
the TLOs and could continue to transfer them directly to companies. Kneller (2003) suggests 
that inventors often turn to the TLOs when an invention has no takers. 
  In order to establish a comprehensive IP management procedure, from the creation and 
evaluation of IPRs, to their management and licensing, the MEXT established a program to 
support the creation of in-house IP management offices (hereinafter referred to as “IP 
offices”) within universities. In August 2003, just before the Incorporation, 43 universities 
have launched an IP office to develop their own technology transfer management system. 
Their responsibilities partially overlap those of TLOs.  In general, IP offices manage the 
whole IPR procedure from invention disclosure to patent application, and they have final 
authority over patenting and licensing decisions as the patent owner through the university.  
But some parts of the procedure, which need professional skills such as marketing, patent 
surveys and licensing, are outsourced to TLOs. In some universities, relations between the IP 
offices and TLOs have been managed smoothly, while in others, there has been friction. The 
issue is that they have different decision-making structures in terms of IP management and the 
way to deal with research contracts; it is particularly true in their way to manage license 
earnings, patent costs and contract specifications.  
  The inventor has different people to deal with, and the delimitation of power is not 
s and IP management Offices. An important issue to address  always clear between the TLO
                                                        
3 In 2001, the MITI was reorganized to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).   7
[Fig. 3: IP Managemen
                                                       
for the newly incorporated universities is how to resolve the inherent complexity and 
coordination of a dual structure system. In terms of manpower, IP offices and TLOs employ a 
relatively similar number of staff for licensing and IP management related tasks, the 
difference being that IP offices have more personnel dedicated to the development of 
sponsored research and industrial liaison. Their job is not only to create IP, but to find 
industrial partners to cooperate with.  
 
On a more practical level, there are three types of IP management organizational 
configurations. The IP office is always within the university; as for TLOs there are three kinds 
of settings. The first one is the “internal model”, IP offices and TLOs are merged within the 
university, it is usually seen in private universities and in some national universities that have 
launched their TLOs in the last 2 or 3 years. In this configuration, the two structures are 
coexisting within the university, but there is a division of labor. IP offices are handling the 
invention disclosure process, the management of IPRs resulting from contractual research, 
and they deal with the Japan Patent Office. TLOs are in charge of the practical use of the 
IPRs, such as finding licensing partners, and supporting the creation of university spin-offs.  
The second type is “External & Exclusive
4, it is the case in most national universities. 
The TLOs are outside the university structure, though they are dealing only with a single 
university. Recently, some universities have exited this type, we could name for instance the 
Tokyo Institute of Technology. They have wholly integrated their TLOs to strengthen the 
coordination of their activities.  
 The third type is “External & non-Exclusive”. In that case one university has alliances 
or cooperation agreements with more than two TLOs depending on its policy and/or 
characteristics.  This organization has the merit to foster the specialization of TLOs in terms 
of technologies; and/or activities, for instance some specialize in start-up support. One of its 
main demerits is the resulting complexity of the arrangements between multiple universities 
and TLOs. This type is concentrated on the Kansai area (Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe Region) where a 
large number of universities are concentrated in a relative small territory, it is rarely seen in 
the rest of Japan. 
Hence, Japanese universities have 2 entities/offices simultaneously promoting 
technology transfer activities, especially IP-related activities. From the standpoint of 
intellectual property management, they pursue three goals, such as 1) Creation of Intellectual 
property, 2) Protection of Intellectual property, 3) Exploitation of Intellectual property. 
Practically, these goals are achieved by a number of activities: implementation of 
commissioned and joint research, examination of new inventions, patent application and 
management, technology transfer through licensing and marketing, support to start-up 
companies, managing consulting activities of faculty members, dealing with conflict of 
interests. In total, a recent MEXT survey of industry-academia technology transfer specialists, 
has defined 44 missions that are conducted by either IP offices or TLOs
5. 
t in Japanese Universities: Incomes] 
 
4 Or “Almost Exclusive” to be more precise. For instance, in the case of Tohoku University, its TLO (Tohoku 
Technoarch) deals with other universities of the region, however around 90% of its workload is centered on 
Tohoku University. 
5 See Takahashi and Watanabe (2007) for an in-depth analysis of the subject.   8
Figure 3 shows the different sources of income of TLOs and IP offices, for the fiscal 
year (F.Y.) 2005. The first thing that we notice is that the income generated by licensing 
revenues is rather sleek. At best it accounts for 26,9% in the TLOs structures, while for the 
internal IP offices it drops to 13,6%. This figure shows that the lion’s share of these 
institutions’ revenue comes from subsidies. IP Offices are heavily subsidized by the 
universities and the MEXT, which runs a five year plan (2003-2008) to help fostering them. 
The TLOs receive important subsidies from the METI. The main point here is that these 
structures have been promoted by the government as a way to develop university-industry 
relationships, but the figure showing the different sources of income reveals a financial 
imbalance of the activity. So far they have not been able to cover their operating costs after 
ten years of operations for the oldest TLOs, and nearly five for the IP Offices
6. This 
phenomenon is quite common, indeed not all the universities are wining in the patent casino, 
few patents actually bring in income, and many are paying more to run their technological 
transfer activities than they are bringing-in license revenues.  
3.3 Contractual Research 
Contractual research is an important aspect of Japanese universities’ technology transfer 
policies. It is one of the main channels of university-industry collaboration and IP-related 
activities. In that respect, it has two important characteristics. First, researches resulting from 
such contracts are likely to be licensed smoothly because there is already an industrial partner; 
second, IPRs are at the center of the negation process while finalizing a contract. Thus we 
intend to explain concisely how it operates. 
If a company, or any organization, wants to have a formal research agreement with a 
national university, then it has to enter into either a commissioned
7 or joint research contract 
with the university. In case of joint research, the university receives funds and researchers 
mainly from private firms to conduct research on common projects
8. Under commissioned 
research, researchers in universities are appointed by firms, research institutes, or 
governmental agencies to carry out research by contract. The principal difference between 
these two types of contract is that in joint research, company researchers can work in the 
university laboratories, while this option is not available under commissioned research 
contract. Generally, more than 80% of commissioned research projects are conducted with the 
national government, or with a private company under a national project scheme. On the 
contrary, the bulk of joint research contracts are directly carried out with private companies. 
[Tab1: Contractual Research by National Universities] 
Joint and commissioned research is an important mean of technology transfer for 
Japanese universities. The legal framework was enacted in 1983, and such transfers have 
grown in number and yen value ever since. Table 1 shows the trend over a 20-year period. In 
the last ten years only, joint research has been multiplied by 7 and commissioned research by 
3. For joint research the average amount spent on one contract has been stable - if we exempt 
s for commissioned research the amount has been increasing  the first years’ hike - wherea
                                                        
6 IP offices have their own operating funds, so their accounting can be traced. 
7 It is sometime referred by the term “sponsored research”. 




On the company side use of joint and commissioned research, we could cite a 
MEXT (2007) survey which was sent to Japanese companies with a capital superior to ¥1 
billion, with the aim of understanding their research strategies better
9. One part of the 
questionnaire was related to their outside partners, especially universities. Responding to 
where the companies intended to spend more money as an external provider of research, 
Japanese universities came first. When asked to provide an appreciation of their joint 
activities with Japanese universities, 36,8% judged contractual research with university as a 
positive experience, second only to the ability of the university to solve complex problems 
(49,9%). More specifically, a question was formulated to evaluate the pros and cons of 
conducting contractual research with universities
10. On the positive side, the three most 
common answers are: the enhancement of the firm’s research capabilities, the outsourcing of 
basic research, and the creation of a research network. On the negative side, the top three are: 
the non applicability of some university research, the lack of secrecy, and the difficulty to 
gain a monopoly on the IP resulting from common research. This shows that the companies 
value collaboration with the university, as it expands their knowledge capabilities, but they 
have some concerns about the openness of the relation, which might be seen as a possible 
threat to the traditional open environment of university research. 
4 Tohoku University 
This section will present the case of Tohoku University, a leading Japanese research 
university. The aim is to show how it adapts itself to a new environment favorable to patents. 
4.1 A short presentation 
In this section we briefly presents our unit of analysis, Tohoku University, and give figures 
about the recent trends in its patenting activity.  
Tohoku University was founded in Sendai in 1907 as Tohoku Imperial University. It 
was the third Imperial University in Japan. It is located in Sendai, the most important city of 
the Tohoku Region (North-East of Japan). It is known as a strong research university; the 
2008 Shanghai academic ranking put it in 4th place among Japanese universities and 79th in 
the world. The Thomson ISI list of the most cited papers in the world ranked Tohoku 
University 2nd in the field of material science, 13th for physics and 22nd for chemistry. In the 
national context it is widely known as one of the flagship universities
11. 
In order to define its patenting activity, we have to make a distinction between 
d university-invented patents. University-owned patents are 
 
9 Of the 1,791 initially contacted, 941 companies replied. 





patents where the university owns the IPRs. Unfortunately, data on university-owned patents 
are only a reliable indicator for the US and Canada. For European data, in the 80s and 90s, 
there is a downward bias if you only look at university-owned patents. This is due to the 
tendency of European academic researchers to leave the property rights of their invention to 
the firm that financed the project, but yet to be included in the list of inventors. Therefore, 
there is no official record of these transactions by the university administration, we have to 
use a different indicator to encompass this phenomenon: University-invented patents. They 
are the ones that have at least one faculty member listed as inventor, whether the university is 
assigned the patent or not. In recent years there have been a few studies on university-
invented patents to take into account this fact, notably in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany 
and Italy
12. 
[Fig.4: Tohoku University Patents] 
In the case of Japan, the phenomenon was mainly similar until the Incorporation. 
Kneller (2003) illustrated how a majority of university discoveries were transferred directly 
from inventors to companies under the disguise of donations, the researcher being listed on 
the patent application as an inventor. Recent reports from the National Institute of Science 
and Technology Policy (NISTEP) (Kanama and Okuwada 2007, 2008) investigate this issue. 
They use the concept of university-invented patent. They have listed the names of all 
researchers that have filed an invention disclosure during the period 1993-2004 at Tohoku 
University, then looked up all these names in the Japanese Patent database in the inventor 
section. In the case of a university-invented patent, the university does not have any 
ownership rights on the patent, despite the fact that there is at least one faculty member listed 
as an inventor; university-owned patents are the property of the university. One of the many 
interesting results of this NISTEP study is presented in Figure 4. It describes Tohoku 
university-owned and invented patents. We see that up to 1999, university-owned patents 
were quite inconsequential: their number started to rise in 2000 as a consequence of the TLO 
Law and Japanese Bayh-Dole Act, but it really shows a dramatic increase after Incorporation. 
Until 2000, only a minority of the inventions disclosures led to a patent application by the 
university. Alternatively, university-invented patents were quite high throughout the period, 
with an increase in 1999-2000 and a decrease after 2004 when the university started to 
manage its IPRs more aggressively. Overall, we see from Figure 4 that university members 
have been active for a long time in the IPR business with changes of ownership during time, 
from the research partner to the university, and that the trend is upward. This result can be 
used to give a better understanding of Figure 2, the rise of the patenting activity that occurred 
in 2004 did not come from a vacuum. The potential was there before; it just took more 
informal channels to diffuse. The faculty members were transferring their IP rights to the 
companies they were collaborating with. We will see in the next section how this informal 
cooperation changed to a more formal one especially through cooperative research. 
4.2 patenting 
The aim of this section is to explain the trend of Tohoku University patenting activity from 
the Incorporation to 2007. We will take into account: the total number of applications by the 




applicant, in that case it exercises full ownership) and co-application, namely the university 
shared the ownership with a third party (third parties may be companies, research 
organizations, government agencies, etc.). The following analysis focuses on the above-
mentioned elements. To begin with, it is important to restate that one of the principal elements 
of university-industry cooperation in Japan is contractual research, its importance has been 
increasing since 1995 (1st Basic Plan on Science and Technology) until the year 2008, the 
movement preceded and sustained itself after the Incorporation of 2004. In the same token, 
the proportion of co-application has increased as well. Notably, after the Incorporation, the 
proportion of co-applications has remarkably widened. In 2005, national universities, TLOs 
and public research organizations have applied for 5,878 national patents, among which 28% 
are linked to joint research and 15% to commissioned research, collectively research contracts 
are at the source of 47% of co-applications (Ijichi and Nagaoka, 2007). 
When a university files for a domestic patent in Japan, there are two options; a co-
application or a single application: for co-applications it may or may not be linked to a 
research contract. In cases of collaborative contracts between a university and a company, the 
name of the university inventor is listed as well. As for the technological classification, the 
recommendation of the second Science and Technology Basic Plan (2001, March 30) is to 
divide the technologies into four categories as follows: 
1.  Life Sciences, 
2.  Information and Telecommunications (IT), 
3.  Environmental Sciences, 
4.  Nanotechnology/materials. 
 
When the invention disclosure is filed, the inventor chooses one the above-mentioned 
categories to classify it. Practically, in case of contractual research, the university manages the 
IPRs in the following manner:
13 
1.  Tohoku University (TU) shall own all IPRs arising from the results of its contractual 
research. 
2.  TU may license such IPRs to the company for a fee or may transfer all or parts to the 
company. 
3.  If TU and the company jointly hold any IPRs, TU and the company shall enter into a 
joint application agreement or joint ownership agreement, which shall include the 
three following clauses:  
A.  TU may not Exploit the IPRs in any area outside of the research area; 
B.  The Company may Exploit the IPRs itself without the consent of TU; 
C.  The Company shall pay to TU all expenses paid by TU to file an application and 
maintain such IPRs until the company enters into an agreement with TU, and shall pay 
all necessary expenses after the execution of such agreement; 
 
[Fig.5: Tohoku University Patents Application by Technological Field and Type of 
Contract] 
 
13 To be precise, there are some minor differences in terms of IPRs between commissioned research and joint 
research contracts.   12
During 2004-2007, 735 professors have been listed as inventors on at least one patent; 
in 2008 there was an increase of 27,8% of the faculty involved in patents. As a matter of 
comparison, we can compare to similar data available for the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (M.I.T) where, from 1983 to 1997, approximately half of the teaching staff has 
been involved in at least one patent, in three years about a quarter of Tohoku university staff 
has filed an invention disclosure, of which many will lead to a patent. 
In the case of co-applications, there are two scenarios: a research contract that leads to 
a co-application, and a co-application without prior research contract. Unfortunately, we do 
not have data for the first year (2004), but since 2005 the university administration has kept 
statistics on this subject. Figure 5 displays the proportion of single and co-application on the 
abscissa and the proportion of patent applications linked to contractual research on the 
ordinate, the data is grouped according to technological fields. The data clearly reveals some 
tendencies: there is an increase in the proportion of co-applications, and it is linked 
significantly with contractual research. There are also differences among the technological 
categories: IT increasing its share in the total number of co-applications but having relatively 
less use in contractual research. In nanotechnology, a high proportion of applications are 
linked to prior contracts. On the other hand, life sciences have a high share of single 
application by the university and fewer associations with contracts. 
The overall tendency lies in the fact that the administration of the university puts a lot 
of emphasis on collaborative research contracts, as they are the source of research funding, 
future inventions and resulting patents. Besides, various measures have been taken to support 
the university-industry relations in Tohoku University: the university-industry liaison office 
has been strengthened, each department now has administrative employees in charge of the 
liaison, furthermore some professionals from outside the university have been hired to 
facilitate university-industry collaboration. 
5 Discussion 
The increasing reliance on IPRs by Japanese universities is definitely a widespread 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the speed with which these changes took place is quite 
impressive: in a few years’ time, they have greatly expanded their usage of IPR alongside an 
increased reliance on contractual research. The relations seem to have become more 
contractual since the Incorporation. Table 2 shows the speed and scope of IPR activities by 
Japanese and American universities. In only a few years, Japan has increased its IPR-related 
activities. The amount spend by invention disclosure is at the same level as in the American 
case. In terms of number, and considering their relative size, the number of invention 
disclosures and patent applications are quite similar. The ratio, patent application to invention 
disclosure, is higher in Japan, which can be partly explained by the pressure to develop their 
patenting activity, a relative lack of experience by the university administration in evaluating 
the inventions, and strong incentives placed on the researchers. The number of patents granted 
is relatively low, which is normal as it is quite a new phenomenon. As for licensing and 
university spin-offs, the numbers in Japan are still quite low compared to the US. 
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On a more theoretical perspective, an important question remains: What are the 
implications of the increasing use of IPRs by Japanese universities. As we have illustrated, a 
lot of emphasis has been put on this particular channel of technology transfer by the 
university. The question then is whether or not it is detrimental for the research done by the 
faculty members. 
First, we can argue that this channel is not the most important one. Agrawal and 
Henderson  (2002), based on both qualitative and quantitative data from the MIT, have 
showed that patenting is a minority activity. Indeed, a majority of the faculty in their sample 
had never patented. Furthermore, publication rates far outstrip patenting rates. On a more 
qualitative point of view, most faculty members estimate that patents account for less than 
10% of the knowledge that is being transferred from their labs. Additionally, considerable 
concern has been expressed in recent years regarding a possible negative impact of patenting 
on the public good’s nature of academic work. This is called the crowding-out hypothesis. 
Two stories are at stake here: first the possible risk of a switch towards a more applied 
research by academic scientists as opposed to basic research; second a change in the reward 
structure encouraging to seek IP protection of the research results, therefore possibly 
postponing scientific publications. 
As a consequence, there is a need for better understanding of the influences of these 
policy changes on the research activity of faculty members. One related question, often used 
as a proxy to this problematic, is the link between patenting and publication activities of 
academic researchers. Empirical research tends to indicate that these activities are 
complementary rather than substitutive. Many studies of academic inventors have shown a 
positive correlation between patenting and publishing, suggesting that commercialization does 
not come at the expense of public disclosure of scientific discoveries by scientific members 
(Breschi et al. (2005), Carayol (2007),Van Looy et al. (2006), Stephan et al. (2007)).  
In the case of Japan, we have to take into account its long history of university-
industry relationships. For instance, the Department of Engineering of Tokyo University has 
an extensive relation with industry; 32% of the department members have been an inventor on 
at least one industrial patent, 46% of them had no less than a paper collaboration with firms, 
and 22% did both (Baba and Goto, 2007). The figures are very high for both channels. The 
next step would be to gain a better understanding of the different mechanisms at stake in the 
Japanese context, when choosing how to transfer a university technology. To start with, we 
have already shown (Fig 5) that depending on the technological fields, the patenting strategies 
differ in terms of contractual research and patent application considerations. Then, it is 
important to comprehend what incentives are at stake for the faculty members. Further 
researches are needed. 
On the case of Tohoku University, Carraz and Takahashi (2009) have conducted an 
econometric analysis on the determinants of academic patenting by Tohoku university staff 
since the Incorporation. The paper intends to explain which factors are at stake in the 
patenting behavior of faculty members. Three types of variables have been tested: 
publications, funding, and individual characteristics. We have used a Zero Inflated Negative 
Binomial model as it fitted the characteristics of the variables. The first result relates to the 
publication level. We find a positive and significant relation between patenting and 
publishing. Accordingly, these two activities seem to be complementary, which is in line with   14
many empirical studies. At the department level though, the quality of the department 
publications affects the probability of a researcher to stay in the non-patenting regime. We 
can see in this pattern a kind of specialization, with some research units putting more focus on 
publishing for high quality journals and some other doing research more related to patenting 
outcomes. 
As for contractual funding, whether public or private, we have found a positive 
correlation. Moreover, getting public contractual funding significantly affects the probability 
of reaching the patenting regime. This appears to be counterintuitive, but it may be justified 
by the fact that the amount of public funding is a signal of the quality of the research done. At 
the departmental level, public funding affects negatively the dependent variable. It is very 
interesting, as it shows again a kind of specialization, the amount of public contractual 
funding being negatively correlated with the patenting activity. 
Lets now move to the individual characteristics. One of the main criteria of evaluation 
for a scientist and his/her parent academic institution is the quality of their publication 
portfolio. In the academic sphere, the game is defined by the priority of the discovery and the 
underlying peer-review system that validates the discovery (David,  2007). There is a 
reinforcing mechanism in place, which provides more opportunities to the ones who are 
already successful, the Matthew Effect as it is often called in the literature. Therefore, young 
researchers may not consider patenting if it affects negatively their publication outcome, 
while older researchers may have more incentives to patent as they may place more value on 
social wealth (Carayol, 2007). We therefore assumed an inverted-U shape relationship 
between age and patenting activity. In our data set, The Age1 dummy variable, researchers 
from 26 to 35 years old, correlates positively with patenting. Therefore the youngest scholars 
differ from the older ones in their patenting decision patterns. This could be linked to the fact 
that career advancement and patenting seem to be related: there is a positive link between the 
dummy promotion and patenting. It signals a possible change of reward structure as the IP 
activity and promotion seems to be positively correlated, along with the fact that the younger 
generation is getting engaged relatively more in IP activities compared to the older. 
6 Concluding remarks 
Japanese universities have embraced academic patenting enthusiastically since the 
Incorporation of national universities. They have increased their reliance on IPR strategies. At 
the governmental level, many regulations have been enacted since the mid-90s in order to 
promote university-industry relations. At the university level, the supporting structures have 
strengthened, but one should be cautious in interpreting these trends. First, they were not built 
from scratch, we have showed that the IPRs were already transferred to companies on a large 
scale, the difference being that these relationships are now more formalized in the form of 
contracts. Second, the Japanese system isn’t exempt from some cultural idiosyncrasies: for 
instance one of the main mechanism used for technology transfers is contractual research, 
whereas licensing and university spin-offs are quite rare. By developing the use of IPRs, the 
relations with contractual partners become more formal, and consequently easier to monitor. 
However if one of the tacit goals is to develop an entrepreneurship based on IPRs, there could 
be a kerfuffle over the efficiency of the maneuver. 
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[Fig. 1: Invention Disclosures and Patent Applications by National Universities] 
 
[Fig. 2: Patent Applied by Japanese Universities According to Frequency] 
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 [Fig. 3: IP Management in Japanese Universities: Incomes] 
 












[Tab1: Contractual Research by National Universities] 
Category  Fiscal Year 1985  Fiscal Year 1985  Fiscal Year 1985 
Joint Research  216  1,704  12,405 
Av. Amount per contract  ￿¥5,157,405  ¥2,413,730  ¥2,442,790 
Commissioned  Research  1,700 3,027 10,082 
Av. Amount per contract  ¥2,051,765  ¥4,662,370  ¥10,926,640 
a) The number are compiled from the MEXT website; b)$1=¥120 



















Japan ¥M200  9,924  7,187  72%  295  1,056  ¥Bn.  1,07 46 
USA $M2  17,382  10,270  59%  3,278  4,932  $Bn.  1,395  462 
a
 
) Source: adapted from UTTA (2007); b)$1=¥120 